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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
DOUGLAS DILLON, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20020595-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions of one count each of failure to 
respond to an officer's signal to stop, theft, and burglary, all third degree 
felonies, and misdemeanor traffic violations. R. 164-64. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction for 
burglary? 
Standard of review. Because defendant did not preserve this issue below, 
this Court will review it only for plain error or exceptional circumstances. State 
v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, Tf 112, 32, 55 P.3d 1131 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, Tff 11, 17, 10 R3d 346). This Court will also review an unpreserved 
sufficiency claim to determine whether counsel was ineffective for failing to 
preserve the issue. See State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, \ \ 18"19/ 4 2 P.3d 1248. 
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law/' State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, If 6, 89 P.3d 162 (citing 
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). 
2. Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor improperly questioned 
defendant on cross-examination, has defendant demonstrated prejudice? 
Standard of Review. This Court "will reverse the jury's verdict on the 
basis of prosecutorial misconduct if defendant demonstrates that '[1] [t]he 
actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call to the attention of the jury a matter it 
would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict and, [2] if so, 
under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is substantial 
and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, 
there would have been a more favorable result/" State v. Basta, 966 P.2d 260, 268 
(Utah Ct. App 1998) (quoting State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) (additional quotations omitted) (alterations in original)). 
Defendant objected to only one of the allegedly improper cross-
examination questions. Therefore, as to the other questions, defendant must 
demonstrate that plain error occurred or exceptional circumstances exist. See 
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State v. Vean, 2004 UT 63, \ 13, 95 P.3d 276 ("appellate courts will not consider an 
issue, including constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal 
unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional 
circumstances") (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tf 11,10 P.3d 346). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following 
constitutional provision and statute, the relevant portions of which are 
reproduced below. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . 
have the assistance of counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST, amend. VI 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully 
in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (West 2004) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant by amended information with one count each 
of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, theft, and burglary, all third 
degree felonies, driving with a suspended license, a class B misdemeanor, and 
improper passing and speeding, both class C misdemeanors. R. 103-04. After a 
series of pre-trial delays, mostly necessitated by repeated changes in defense 
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counsel, the case was tried to a jury on 29 April 2002. R. 4,30, 58, 81,153-54. The 
jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 164-67. The trial court entered its 
judgment and sentence on 6 June 2002. R. 160-63. Defendant filed a pro se 
timely notice of appeal on 21 June 2002. R. 170. Trial counsel filed a second 
notice of appeal on 16 July 2002, after the trial court ordered "the appeal time 
period to be stayed from 6/21/02 thru [7/15/02] to allow for timely filing of the 
notice of appeal/' R. 174,175. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant leads police on a high-speed chase 
On 18 May 2000, Detective Copeland of the Hurricane police department 
was on routine patrol. R. 190: 70-71. Sometime between 10:30 p.m. and 11:00 
p.m. he encountered defendant driving a truck with Arizona license plates. R. 
190: 71. Detective Copeland maneuvered his unmarked police car behind 
defendant's truck to run a check on defendant's license plate. R. 190: 71. 
Defendant "instantly made a U-turn" and then a series of right-hand turns. R. 
190: 71-72. 
Detective Copeland activated the lights below his rear-view mirror and 
defendant pulled over. R. 190: 72,109. Detective Copeland got out of his car and 
approached defendant's truck. R. 190: 72. As Detective Copeland neared the 
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back of defendant's truck, defendant "punched it and took off down the road/' 
R. 190: 72. 
Defendant led Detective Copeland on a high-speed chase for about three 
and a half miles. R. 190: 75. Defendant eventually stopped when he saw other 
police cars approaching from the opposite direction. R. 190: 75-76. Defendant 
explained to the officers that he ran because he was driving on a suspended 
license. R. 190: 77. 
Officers discover holt cutters and stolen tools in defendant's truck 
When Detective Copeland requested defendant's wallet, defendant said 
that it was in the console of his truck. R. 190: 77. While looking through the 
console, Detective Copeland observed several tools in the back seat of 
defendant's truck. R. 190: 77. Many of the tools were marked "Zitting 
Construction" or "Zitting Brothers/' R. 190: 78, 81. Detective Copeland also 
located bolt cutters in defendant's truck. R. 190: 99. 
Detective Copeland asked defendant how long he had had the tools and 
defendant replied "a short time." R. 190: 78. When Detective Copeland asked 
"How long is a short time?" defendant replied, "A couple of weeks." R. 190: 78. 
After booking defendant into jail, Detective Copeland and another officer 
returned to the area where defendant was first seen and found a construction 
trailer that had been burglarized. R. 190: 82. Police contacted Bill Zitting, the 
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owner of the trailer, who came and verified that tools had been stolen from the 
trailer. R. 190: 83,157,171. Mr. Zitting explained that he had locked the tools in 
the trailer around 5:00 p.m. the previous evening. R. 190: 159,173. Mr. Zitting 
also verified that the tools that were found in defendant's truck belonged to 
Zitting Construction and were the tools that had been taken from the trailer. R. 
190: 86, 157. All of the tools that were stolen from the construction trailer were 
discovered in defendant's truck. R. 190:152. 
Officers found a padlock in the dirt next to the trailer. R. 190:101-03. The 
padlock itself was not cut, but Detective Copeland testified that it appeared 
someone had used bolt cutters to cut the trailer's hasp—the mechanism that 
connected the lock to the trailer. R. 190: 92, 103, 105-06. Based on his 
observations, Detective Copeland believed that it would have been easier to cut 
the hasp rather than the lock because the hasp was thinner. R. 190: 106. Mr. 
Zitting also believed, based on his observations, that the hasp had been cut with 
bolt cutters because the hasp was "pinched and separated" where it had been 
cut. R. 190:176. 
Back at the jail, Detective Copeland interviewed defendant after defendant 
waived his Miranda rights. R. 190: 94-95. Defendant claimed he had purchased 
the tools from a man for $300 but could not provide any information identifying 
this man. R. 190: 95-96. 
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Defendant's story 
At trial, defendant denied that he burglarized the construction trailer. R. 
190: 241. He claimed that he had purchased stolen tools from Al Flori at a Days 
Inn motel around 9:00 p.m. or 9:30 p.m. on the evening of the burglary. R. 190: 
230, 232-34, 235. However, defendant could not remember exactly which of the 
stolen tools in his truck he had purchased from Flori. R. 190: 231, 247-48. 
Defendant believed the bolt cutters were his because he did not remember 
purchasing them from Flori. R. 190: 231. Defendant claimed that he had been 
purchasing used tools from Flori "for years/7 R. 190: 230-31, 241. When the 
prosecutor asked defendant why he did not tell Detective Copeland Al Floras 
name, defendant responded that he "just didn't want to give it to him." R. 190: 
248. 
Defendant testified that he drove off after Detective Copeland initially 
pulled him over because Detective Copeland "didn't appear to be a cop." R. 190: 
236. Defendant testified that Detective Copeland was not in uniform, nor was he 
in a "cop car." R. 190: 236. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court did not plainly err, nor was counsel ineffective for 
allowing the burglary charge to go to the jury, because the evidence amply 
supported defendant's burglary conviction. Detective Copeland first spotted 
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defendant's truck in the same area as the burglarized construction trailer, and the 
jury could infer that defendant was guilty based on his flight from Detective 
Copeland. All of the tools that were stolen from Mr. Zitting's construction trailer 
were discovered in defendant's truck less than six hours after Mr. Zitting locked 
them in the construction trailer. A pair of bolt cutters was also discovered in 
defendant's truck and both Detective Copeland and Mr. Zitting testified that, 
based upon their observations, it appeared that someone had gained access to the 
trailer by cutting the hasp with bolt cutters. Moreover, defendant gave 
conflicting explanations as to why he possessed the stolen tools. 
II. Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor asked some improper questions 
when cross-examining defendant, and that the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the alleged 
misconduct. Even without the allegedly improper questions, the jury would 
have convicted defendant based on the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE AMPLY SUPPORTED DEFENDANT'S 
BURGLARY CONVICTION 
Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his 
burglary conviction.1 Aplt. Br. at 13-19. He argues that there was no evidence 
1
 Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
his other convictions. 
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establishing that the bolt cutters in his truck were used to cut the hasp on the 
trailer. Aplt. Br. at 16. He also notes the officers' failure to take any fingerprints 
at the crime scene. Aplt. Br. at 16-17. Defendant also argues that the evidence "is 
not inconsistent" with his story that he purchased the stolen tools earlier that 
evening. Aplt. Br. at 18. 
Because defense counsel did not raise this issue below, defendant must 
demonstrate that plain error occurred or exceptional circumstances exist. State v. 
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, ^ 12, 32,55 P.3d 1131 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
W 11,17,10 P.3d 346). Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to preserve the issue. Br. Aplt. at 18-19. Defendant cannot demonstrate 
plain error, exceptional circumstances, or ineffective assistance of counsel. 
A, No error, let alone plain error, occurred because 
overwhelming evidence supported defendant's burglary 
conviction; nor has defendant shown that exceptional 
circumstances exist 
"To demonstrate that plain error occurred in the context of a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant must show 'first that the evidence 
was insufficient to support a conviction of the ctime[s] charged and second that 
the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury/" Diaz, 2002 UT App 288 at ^ 32 (quoting Holgate, 
2000 UT 74 at f 32). To determine whether the evidence was insufficient, this 
Court will "first examine the record to determine whether, 'after viewing the 
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evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crimefs] for which he or she was convicted/" Diaz, 
2002 UT App 288 at \ 33 (quoting Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at % 18). Only if this Court 
finds that the evidence was insufficient will it inquire "'whether the evidentiary 
defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case 
to the jury/" Id. 
No reasonable juror would have had a reasonable doubt about defendant's 
guilt. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the reasonable inference from the 
evidence is that he used the bolt cutters in his truck to cut the trailer hasp. See 
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288 at | 33 (holding that in the context of a sufficiency 
challenge, all inferences from the evidence are drawn "in a light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict"). Detective Copeland first spotted defendant's truck in the 
same area as the burglarized construction trailer. R. 190: 71, 82. All of the tools 
that were stolen from Mr. Zitting's construction trailer were located in 
defendant's truck less than six hours after Mr. Zitting locked them in the 
construction trailer. R. 71, 86, 157, 159, 173. A pair of bolt cutters was also 
located in defendant's truck and both Detective Copeland and Mr. Zitting 
testified that, based upon their observations, it appeared that someone had 
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gained access to the trailer by cutting the hasp with bolt cutters. R. 190: 99, 92, 
103, 105-06, 176. Defendant's flight from Detective Copeland also supported a 
reasonable inference of guilt. See State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) ("Although flight is not absolute proof of guilt, it may support a reasonable 
inference of guilt") (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781,789 (Utah 1991)). 
Perhaps most damming were defendant's conflicting explanations for his 
possession of the stolen tools. Defendant first told Detective Copeland that he 
had had the tools for "[a] couple of weeks" and had purchased them from 
another man. R. 190: 78,95-96. However, defendant could not provide the man's 
name or any other identifying information. R. 190: 95-96. Defendant told a 
different story at trial. He testified that he had purchased the tools from a long-
time associate named Al Flori around 9:00 p.m. on the evening of the burglary. 
R. 190: 230, 232-34,235. 
Furthermore, defendant could not explain at trial how the stolen tools 
ended up in his truck. When asked on direct examination to explain how he 
acquired the stolen tools, defendant gave a series of rambling and disjointed 
responses, taking nearly two pages of transcript before he finally explained that 
he purchased the tools from Flori. R. 190: 229-31. Even then, defendant could 
not remember whether Flori had sold him all of the stolen tools that were 
discovered in his truck. R. 190: 231, 247-48. When asked whether the tools that 
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Flori sold him were "[t]he same ones that were in your [truck] that. . . evening?" 
defendant responded: 
See that, I know it there was a, there was a handful of . . . Yeah, they 
were the same ones. But I don't know what I had in any truck or 
w h a t . . . I know he gave me four or five power tools, and they were 
Dewalt. 
R. 190: 231. Officers did recover from defendant's truck a Dewalt sander, router, 
and saw that had been stolen from the Zitting Construction trailer. (State's 
Exhibit 12, contained in an unpaginated manila exhibit envelope.) However, 
officers also recovered from defendant's truck a tool belt, level, staple gun, 
Hitachi nail gun, Hitachi router, and a Skilsaw saw, all of which had also been 
stolen from the Zitting Construction trailer. State's Exhibit 12. Therefore, even 
assuming that defendant actually did meet Flori and purchased "four or five 
[Dewalt] power tools" from him on the night of the burglary, defendant did not 
explain how the other stolen tools ended up in his truck. Defendant's failure to 
explain his possession of the stolen tools, his inconsistent stories, his flight, and 
the testimony of the State's witnesses provided overwhelming evidence of his 
guilt. 
The officers' failure to take any fingerprints at the crime scene does not 
render the evidence insufficient. Finding defendant's fingerprints on the 
burglarized construction trailer certainly would have made the State's case 
stronger, but the lack of such evidence does not render the evidence that was 
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introduced at trial "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime[s] for which he or she was convicted/" Diaz, 2002 UT App 
288 at 1f 33 (quoting Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^ 18). Moreover, it is unlikely that the 
officers could have located defendant's fingerprints on the burglarized trailer 
because defendant would not have had to touch the trailer to open it. Rather, 
after using the bolt cutters to cut the hasp, defendant could have also 
manipulated the bolt cutters to remove the padlock and open the trailer doors. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the evidence was inconsistent with his 
explanation of how he obtained the stolen tools. As noted above, defendant 
provided inconsistent explanations about how he obtained the tools. Moreover, 
defendant's story that he purchased "four or five [Dewalt] power tools" from 
Flori on the night of the burglary, R. 190: 231, did not explain the presence of the 
other stolen tools in his truck. 
Even if the evidence were consistent with defendant's trial testimony, that 
did not prevent the jury from convicting defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Assuming that defendant had testified that Flori sold him all of the stolen tools 
that were found in his truck, the jury still could have rejected defendant's 
testimony and convicted him beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Widdison, 
2000 UT App 185, Tf 53, 4 P.3d 100 ("when two reasonable inferences or 
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hypotheses exist, one consistent with innocence and another consistent with 
guilt, the jury can conclude that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt") (citing State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). In fact, 
the jury likely found that defendant lacked credibility because his trial testimony 
was inconsistent with his initial statements to police. 
In sum, defendant has not shown that the evidence was "sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime[s] for 
which he or she was convicted/" Diaz, 2002 UT App 288 at | 33 (quoting 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 118). On the contrary, the only reasonable interpretation 
of the evidence is that defendant possessed Mr. Zitting's stolen tools because 
defendant burglarized the trailer and stole the tools. Therefore, defendant has 
failed to show that any error, let alone obvious error, occurred in submitting the 
burglary charge to the jury. 
Nor has defendant demonstrated that exceptional circumstances exist. 
Exceptional circumstances arise only when "rare procedural anomalies" occur. 
See Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at Tf 12. Defendant does not even argue, let alone 
demonstrate, that any such "procedural anomalies" occurred. Therefore, his 
claim fails. 
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B. Because overwhelming evidence demonstrated that 
defendant committed burglary, his counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict. 
Because overwhelming demonstrated that defendant committed burglary, 
any objection to the sufficiency of the evidence would have been denied. 
Therefore, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a directed 
verdict on that charge. See State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, \ 19, 42 P.3d 1248 
("since any objection to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial would have been 
denied, Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it"). 
Consequently, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel also fails. 
II. DEFENDANT'S PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIM 
FAILS FOR LACK OF PREJUDICE 
Defendant argues that several of the questions that the prosecutor asked 
him on cross-examination were improper and amounted to prosecutorial 
misconduct. Aplt. Br. at 20-28. Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly 
asked him, four times, whether he believed that Detective Copeland was lying 
about various facts in Detective Copeland" s testimony that conflicted with 
defendant's testimony. Aplt. Br. at 22-23. Defendant also complains that the 
prosecutor improperly inquired about his criminal history by asking "Well, did 
you ever buy stolen tools before?" and also twice asking defendant whether his 
reaction was to flee when fearful of being "in trouble with the law." Aplt. Br. at 
25-26. 
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Defendant acknowledges that defense counsel objected to only one of the 
allegedly improper questions. Aplt. Br. at 2, 25. Therefore, defendant argues 
that the trial court plainly erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask the other 
allegedly improper questions. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. Defendant cannot show plain 
error because he cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the allegedly 
improper questions. 
This Court "will reverse the jury's verdict on the basis of prosecutorial 
misconduct if defendant demonstrates that '[1] [t]he actions or remarks of [the 
prosecutor] call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in 
considering in determining its verdict and, [2] if so, under the circumstances of 
the particular case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more 
favorable result/" State v. Basta, 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah Ct. App 1998) (quoting 
State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (additional quotations 
omitted) (alterations in original)). 
Assuming arguendo that the questions about which defendant complains 
were improper, and that these errors should have been obvious to the trial court, 
defendant has not demonstrated prejudice. As discussed above, the evidence in 
this case overwhelming established defendant's guilt. 
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Given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, he cannot establish 
"a reasonable likelihood that, [absent the prosecutor's alleged misconduct], there 
would have been a more favorable result.'" Basta, 966 P.2d at 268. Therefore, his 
claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted Jib August 2005. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on "ZLo August 2005,1 mailed, postage prepaid, four 
accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
99 East Center Street 
PO BOX 1895 
Orem,UT 84059-1895 
X$UL*JUXlJ 
17 
